TED Spread and Modern Stress Gauges
Table of Contents
The TED spread compared unsecured bank funding with U.S. Treasury bills. It became a familiar measure of financial stress, but the original LIBOR-based series is historical. A chart labeled “TED” today needs a closer look: its last observation, replacement rate and construction may tell different stories.
This guide explains how to read historical TED and modern money-market stress spreads in U.S. dollars. Start with the two rates being compared, then ask what moved, whether the data are continuous, and how much the difference can actually establish about funding conditions. For the underlying securities and yield conventions, see money market instruments.
What Is the TED Spread?
The historical TED spread is the three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR rate minus the three-month Treasury bill rate. It compares a benchmark intended to reflect unsecured wholesale bank borrowing with short-term U.S. government debt. FRED’s TEDRATE series uses this rate pair. [1], [2]
A wider spread could reflect greater compensation for unsecured credit exposure and term funding, stronger demand for Treasury bills, or a combination. It was never a direct estimate of a bank’s probability of default. The bill leg matters: Federal Reserve research notes that safe-harbor flows can affect Treasury bill rates independently of unsecured funding rates. [10]
That distinction connects funding prices to liquidity risk management. A higher funding premium can make rolling debt more expensive, while poor market liquidity can make selling assets costly. The spread alone does not reveal an institution’s cash buffer, collateral terms or ability to refinance.
Why the Original TED Series Ended
Three separate events are often collapsed into “LIBOR ended”: a data vendor stopped carrying a series, panel-based benchmark publication ended, and temporary synthetic settings later ceased. The following dates concern the U.S. dollar three-month rate relevant to TED; other currencies and tenors had their own schedules.
| Date | What happened | How to read it |
|---|---|---|
| January 21, 2022 | Last observation displayed for FRED TEDRATE. | An endpoint for that published series. |
| January 31, 2022 | The underlying USD LIBOR series was removed from FRED. | FRED discontinued its calculated TED series. |
| End-June 2023 | The remaining USD LIBOR panels ended. | Panel-based three-month USD LIBOR ceased. |
| September 30, 2024 | Final publication of the remaining synthetic USD settings. | The temporary synthetic three-month setting also ended. |
The 2022 endpoint therefore does not mean panel USD LIBOR ceased that January. FRED documents its own discontinuation; the FCA documents the later benchmark wind-down. [1], [2]
Synthetic USD LIBOR also had different economic content. The FCA required the relevant CME Term SOFR rate plus a fixed ISDA spread adjustment for the temporary settings. This was an unrepresentative methodology for legacy contracts, rather than a fresh panel quotation of unsecured bank borrowing costs. Appending it to an old TED chart would not preserve the original credit-sensitive measure. [3]
TED vs LIBOR–OIS and Modern CP Spreads
The most useful successor depends on the question. To compare unsecured term funding with government bills, retain an unsecured term rate on one side. To reduce direct exposure to bill-specific demand, compare that rate with a matched-maturity overnight-indexed swap rate instead.
An overnight-indexed swap (OIS) exchanges fixed interest against interest based on a compounded overnight reference rate. A three-month OIS quote is the swap’s fixed rate for that maturity, rather than today’s overnight fixing. Historical dollar LIBOR–OIS commonly used an effective-federal-funds-based OIS; a SOFR OIS references SOFR. [9], [4]
The table also shows the Office of Financial Research (OFR) replacements, which use commercial paper (CP).
| Measure | Rate pair | Main interpretation and limit |
|---|---|---|
| Historical TED | 3m USD LIBOR − 3m Treasury bill | Unsecured bank term funding relative to bills; includes bill-leg influences. |
| Historical LIBOR–OIS | 3m USD LIBOR − matched 3m OIS | Term unsecured funding premium relative to an overnight-rate swap; not pure credit risk. |
| OFR’s TED replacement | 3m AA financial CP − 3m Treasury | Selected unsecured financial-issuer funding relative to Treasuries; different issuer sample from LIBOR. |
| OFR’s USD LIBOR–OIS replacement | 3m AA financial CP − 3m SOFR OIS | Selected unsecured term funding relative to SOFR swap pricing; both legs can change. |
OFR specified these two commercial-paper replacements for its Financial Stress Index (FSI), using the Federal Reserve Board’s U.S. three-month AA financial commercial paper rate. Its TED replacement is CP minus Treasury, and its LIBOR–OIS replacement is CP minus SOFR OIS. SOFR minus a Treasury bill is a different comparison. [4]
OFR published the updated FSI on June 27, 2023 and revised its values from January 1, 2022 through that publication using the new inputs. Values before 2022 were unchanged. This was a revision to a composite index’s inputs, not an extension of FRED’s original TED series. Record the index vintage and replacement date when comparing saved charts. [4]
Commercial paper adds an unsecured funding component, but the sample matters. The Fed’s AA financial CP rate is a statistical estimate for a selected market segment, based on issuance trades and maturity estimation. It is not the rate available to every financial institution, and it may not equal any specific executed trade. Replacing it with nonfinancial, asset-backed or lower-rated CP changes the question. [14]
SOFR, SOFR OIS, Term SOFR and Compounded SOFR
SOFR itself measures the cost of overnight cash borrowing collateralized by Treasury securities. It has different tenor and collateral economics from unsecured three-month bank borrowing. [6]
- SOFR OIS: a swap quote linked to overnight SOFR over the specified future period.
- CME Term SOFR: a forward-looking benchmark estimate for a specified tenor, derived from SOFR futures markets. It is not automatically the same quote as a SOFR OIS. [8]
- Compounded SOFR average: a calculation using realized overnight observations over a defined period. The New York Fed’s rolling averages cover past 30-, 90- and 180-calendar-day windows. [7]
“Three-month SOFR” is therefore an incomplete label. Specify the instrument, whether the period is forward-looking or already realized, the start and end dates, and the quote convention before subtracting it from CP.
Worked Example: The Same Widening, Different Causes
Consider a hypothetical comparison of three-month U.S. dollar AA financial CP, Treasury bill and SOFR OIS rates. Assume all quotes have already been put on a comparable annualized basis and are observed at the same time within each case. Case A is the baseline. Cases B and C are alternative later observations, each compared with A; they are not consecutive events. Ignore fees, taxes and remaining quote-conversion differences.
In B, only the bill yield falls. In C, only the CP rate rises. The table shows the inputs, in percent per year, so we can distinguish the two routes to a wider spread.
| Hypothetical case | CP (%) | Bill (%) | SOFR OIS (%) |
|---|---|---|---|
| A: baseline | 5.20 | 4.80 | 5.00 |
| B: bill yield falls | 5.20 | 4.50 | 5.00 |
| C: CP rate rises | 5.50 | 4.80 | 5.00 |
The same CP–bill spread can emerge from a cheaper government funding benchmark or more expensive unsecured funding. Calculating both comparisons makes that distinction visible:
A: CP–bill = (5.20 − 4.80) × 100 = 40 bp. CP–OIS = (5.20 − 5.00) × 100 = 20 bp.
B: CP–bill = (5.20 − 4.50) × 100 = 70 bp. CP–OIS remains (5.20 − 5.00) × 100 = 20 bp.
C: CP–bill = (5.50 − 4.80) × 100 = 70 bp. CP–OIS rises to (5.50 − 5.00) × 100 = 50 bp.
Both B and C widen CP–bill by 30 bp from A. Only C also widens CP–OIS. B could be consistent with stronger demand for bills, but the rate movement does not establish its cause. C shows more expensive CP relative to both benchmarks, but credit concerns, liquidity preferences and changes in the issuing sample still require investigation. Neither result measures expected default losses.
The general rule is simple: the change in a spread equals the change in its first leg minus the change in its second leg. If CP and OIS instead rose together by the same amount, their spread would stay unchanged even though the outright funding rate increased.
Secured Funding and FX Basis Add Different Information
Secured Overnight Funding
SOFR and its relationship to another clearly identified overnight benchmark can help assess secured cash-funding conditions. A comparison with an administered policy rate answers a different question from CP versus a three-month swap. Keep the maturity and rate pair explicit; a high outright SOFR level may simply reflect a high policy-rate environment.
September 2019 illustrates the distinction. Federal Reserve research describes corporate tax outflows and Treasury settlement increasing financing needs while reducing available cash, alongside a sharp rise in overnight funding rates. That is evidence about secured cash supply and demand, rather than proof that three-month unsecured bank credit risk rose by the same amount. [12]
Specific collateral can also command a premium that lowers its repo rate. The New York Fed filters a portion of such “specials” activity when constructing SOFR. For the named-security mechanism, use repo specials trading; for cash, collateral and repayment mechanics, see repurchase agreements. Neither a special bond nor broad secured-funding pressure is synonymous with TED. [6]
Cross-Currency Basis
A cross-currency basis compares funding through currency swaps with a specified direct-funding benchmark. It adds an international dimension: an institution may face expensive swap-based dollar funding even when a domestic dollar rate looks stable.
Sign conventions require care. In the historical euro/yen-against-dollar convention discussed by BIS in September 2016, a negative basis indicated that obtaining dollars through FX swaps was more expensive than direct dollar funding. BIS also explains how hedging demand and constraints on intermediaries’ balance sheets can sustain a basis outside crisis periods. Do not turn “negative” into a universal alarm rule: identify the quoted currency leg, reference rates and tenor first. [13]
A basis chart is not proof of an executable arbitrage after dealing spreads, funding access and balance-sheet costs. The pricing relationships and practical bounds belong in the separate interest rate parity guide.
How to Analyze a Money-Market Stress Spread
- Write the complete rate pair. Include currency, issuer/rating segment, collateral, tenor, swap reference and subtraction order. Reject an unlabeled “SOFR spread.”
- Check dates and construction. Record observation times, holidays, missing-value treatment and whether the chart uses original or revised data. Mark any benchmark replacement rather than joining it invisibly.
- Check quote conventions. A bank-discount bill quote, add-on money-market rate and swap rate are not automatically identical return measures. For a published index, retain and document its defined construction; for your own economic comparison, make the bases comparable and label the transformation.
- Inspect both legs. Calculate their changes separately. Ask whether the apparent premium grew because unsecured funding rose, the comparator fell, or both moved.
- Seek corroborating evidence. Compare related unsecured and secured measures, issuance availability, maturity shortening, trading liquidity and relevant institutional disclosures. Disagreement between gauges can identify the market segment that needs attention.
- State a bounded conclusion. “Selected financial CP became more expensive relative to three-month SOFR OIS” is supported by that pair. A prediction of bank failure or a market crash requires evidence the spread does not supply.
Historical episodes show why the benchmark choice matters. In February 2008, Governor Mishkin discussed the 2007 widening of same-maturity LIBOR–OIS as evidence of term funding strains. OFR’s later transition paper describes a different comparison in March 2020: LIBOR and financial CP rose while SOFR fell. A secured overnight benchmark did not carry the same unsecured credit-sensitive component. These are dated illustrations, not reusable crisis cutoffs. [11], [5]
For the wider transmission from funding pressure to balance sheets and credit availability, see financial crises explained. A spread helps locate pressure within that process; it does not establish the whole process by itself.
Common Mistakes
- Presenting a current TED reading without identifying a replacement. FRED’s original series is discontinued. State the actual rate pair and label any break.
- Replacing LIBOR with overnight SOFR and preserving the old interpretation. Both the term and unsecured-credit exposure have changed.
- Calling SOFR minus a bill OFR’s TED replacement. OFR selected AA financial CP minus three-month Treasury for that input.
- Attributing every widening to credit deterioration. Inspect the bill or OIS leg, liquidity conditions and the issuer sample.
- Mixing observations or units. A stale rate, different maturity or percentage-point/basis-point error can create a misleading comparison.
- Applying one crisis threshold across gauges and eras. Different instruments, benchmarks, market structures and policy settings change what a level means.
Limitations of Stress Spreads
No universal TED, CP–Treasury, CP–OIS or FX-basis level establishes an imminent crisis. A narrow spread also does not prove that every institution can fund itself or that an investor can exit a position.
Price does not show all lost access. A published rate summarizes transactions or quotations that remain observable. An issuer unable to borrow may be absent from the selected segment. Assess availability and quantities alongside prices.
The components are not separately identified. Credit risk, term liquidity, bill demand and intermediation costs can interact. Subtracting two rates does not estimate how much each cause contributed.
Historical comparability is conditional. Changed benchmarks and issuer selection can alter a series even with the same maturity label. Missing observations and carry-forward methods can conceal timing differences. OFR’s transition paper explicitly describes carrying the last observed CP rate forward when an input is missing; that treatment is part of its construction, not a new trade. [5]
A market segment is not a bank’s complete funding cost. Deposit mix, secured borrowing and longer-term liabilities differ across institutions. The Federal Reserve’s 2020 study of average funding costs explicitly distinguished that measure from marginal funding costs. Use the spread for its defined exposure rather than assuming it prices every liability. [10]
Frequently Asked Questions
Sources and Data Dates
Primary sources accessed November 15, 2026. Historical market episodes are identified by date. The worked rate scenarios are hypothetical and are not current observations or estimates of an actual institution’s borrowing costs.
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, TED Spread (DISCONTINUED), TEDRATE. Series definition, last observation and discontinuation notes; displayed update January 28, 2022.
- FCA, About LIBOR transition, updated March 9, 2026. USD panel and final synthetic cessation dates.
- FCA, Decision on synthetic US dollar LIBOR, April 3, 2023. Calculation and legacy-contract purpose.
- OFR, Financial Stress Index: Indicator Update, June 2023, tables and revision explanation; current FSI indicator definitions, Funding category.
- Jeremiah Bejarano, OFR Working Paper 23-07, June 27, 2023. Section 3, replacement rationale, March 2020 comparison and missing-CP treatment. Research-author analysis.
- New York Fed, Secured Overnight Financing Rate Data. Definition, transaction methodology and specials filtering.
- New York Fed, SOFR Averages and Index Data. Rolling compounded windows.
- CME Group, Term SOFR. Forward-looking benchmark description and FAQ.
- ARRC, Interim Report and Consultation, 2016, Box 1. General OIS mechanism and historical USD reference.
- Bowman, Scotti and Vojtech, Federal Reserve How Correlated is LIBOR with Bank Funding Costs?, June 29, 2020. Treasury flows and average versus marginal funding-cost limits.
- Frederic S. Mishkin, Federal Reserve Tools for Responding to Financial Disruptions, February 15, 2008. Same-maturity LIBOR–OIS and term funding strains.
- Anbil, Anderson and Senyuz, Federal Reserve What Happened in Money Markets in September 2019?, February 27, 2020. Overnight cash-funding mechanisms.
- Borio, McCauley, McGuire and Sushko, BIS Covered interest parity lost: understanding the cross-currency basis, September 2016. Historical basis convention, hedging demand and intermediation constraints.
- Federal Reserve Board, About Commercial Paper. Rate calculations, financial-issuer/rating criteria and exclusions.
Disclaimer
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute investment or trading advice. The numerical scenarios are hypothetical. Benchmark definitions, data availability and market practices can change. Historical spreads and replacement measures are not interchangeable, and no spread guarantees a forecast or investment outcome. Verify the data and terms relevant to your analysis and consult a qualified professional about your circumstances.
