Longevity Risk Transfer: Swaps, Mortality Assumptions and Pension Cash Flows
Table of Contents
Longevity risk transfer helps a defined benefit pension plan manage the cost of paying pensions for longer than expected. In a net-settled longevity swap, the plan receives money when the floating payment under the contract exceeds the plan’s scheduled fixed payment. Members still receive their pensions from the plan. A pension buy-out does something different: for the benefits transferred, the insurer takes over the payment obligation.
To compare these arrangements, follow the cash and identify who owes the benefit. The worked example below shows what the plan pays under an exact match, an index mismatch and a missed swap payment.
Why Longer Lives Cost a Pension Plan More
A lifetime defined benefit pension spreads the financial effects of individual longevity across many people. But pooling does not protect the plan if the group as a whole lives longer than projected. If more retirees survive to each payment date, the plan pays more installments. At unchanged benefit amounts and discount rates, that also increases the expected present value of the obligation. A change in discount rates, by comparison, can move the reported present value even when expected payments stay the same. [1] For asset-side management, see liability-driven investing and cash flow matching.
Pooling spreads the costs of individual lifespans. A swap transfers a defined part of the plan’s financial exposure to a counterparty. It does not change what the plan owes members. That differs from a collective defined contribution pension, where the plan can adjust the pension amount under its rules.
How a Longevity Swap Works
A pension plan and its counterparty agree to two sets of payments, or legs. Canada’s federal pension regulator describes this structure for ongoing defined benefit plans: [2]
- The plan pays the fixed leg. The parties set scheduled payments using projected benefits for the covered group and a margin for risk and expenses. “Fixed” means agreed at inception. Each date can have a different dollar amount.
- The counterparty pays the floating leg. In an indemnity hedge it tracks actual insured benefit experience. In an index hedge it follows an agreed reference population, converted to dollars using the contract terms.
If the contract nets payments, the plan receives floating minus fixed. If the floating amount is lower, the plan pays the difference. Members still get their benefits from the plan, which keeps managing the assets and any risks outside the contract. A longevity hedge can track a covered pension that increases with inflation without necessarily protecting the plan against unexpected inflation itself. [2] [3]
How Mortality Assumptions Shape the Fixed Leg
Start with a base mortality table: the probability of dying over a given year for someone alive at a given age. An improvement assumption describes how the probability at a given age could change in future calendar years. For example, a 2% relative improvement takes a 5.0% death probability to 5.0% × 0.98 = 4.9%, a decline of 0.1 percentage point. This does not mean that an individual becomes less likely to die as they age. The model accounts for age and calendar year together. [4]
The plan projects survival to each payment date and applies those probabilities to the benefits owed. Counting lives alone can mislead: ten survivors with large pensions can cost more than fifteen with smaller pensions. Credible plan experience can inform the assumptions. Faster assumed improvement raises projected survival and, all else equal, raises projected costs and the fixed leg in this model. An actuarial valuation table or a statutory funding assumption does not dictate the price of a negotiated hedge. [2] [4] [5]
Worked Example: Three Years of Swap Payments
Suppose a plan starts with 1,000 retirees and pays each survivor $10,000 at each of three year-ends. Anyone who dies on or before a payment date receives no installment for that year. Ignore new entrants, survivor benefits, inflation and discounting. The plan still owes benefits beyond the three years; the example compares only the displayed payments.
To isolate the effect of improvement, use a flat baseline death probability of 5% and reduce it by 2% of the previous year’s rate starting in year 2. That gives conditional death rates of 5.000%, 4.900% and 4.802%. Multiply each year’s starting expected survivor count by one minus that year’s death rate. Year 1 starts with 1,000 retirees, giving 1,000 × 95% = 950 expected survivors. Year 2 gives 950 × 95.1% = 903.45.
Multiply expected survivors by $10,000, round to the nearest dollar and add a hypothetical $50,000 annual margin. Year 1 fixed is 950 × $10,000 + $50,000 = $9,550,000. By year 3, 903.45 × (1 − 4.802%) = 860.066331 expected survivors, giving $8,650,663 fixed after rounding and adding the margin. Suppose 960, 930 and 895 retirees actually survive to the three payment dates. Those counts set the indemnity floating leg. All amounts are in U.S. dollars.
| Year | Actual benefits and floating leg | Fixed leg | Net swap receipt | Plan outflow after swap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | $9,600,000 | $9,550,000 | $50,000 | $9,550,000 |
| 2 | $9,300,000 | $9,084,500 | $215,500 | $9,084,500 |
| 3 | $8,950,000 | $8,650,663 | $299,337 | $8,650,663 |
In year 3, the plan still pays 895 × $10,000 = $8,950,000 to retirees. The swap pays the plan $8,950,000 − $8,650,663 = $299,337. Subtract that receipt from the benefits paid and the plan’s outflow equals the fixed leg. If only 850 retirees survived instead, the plan would pay $8,500,000 in benefits and $150,663 net on the swap, reaching the same outflow. That result depends on an exact match and both parties performing.
To see what the pricing assumption does, hold the margin fixed and model no improvement. Expected year-3 survivors would be 1,000 × 0.953 = 857.375, yielding fixed payments of $8,623,750 in year 3, $26,913 below the improvement scenario. That compares two sets of assumptions at inception. Actual experience does not revise the original fixed schedule.
What the Hedge Can Leave Behind
Basis Risk: The Index and the Plan Can Diverge
Suppose an index hedge uses the same fixed leg solely for comparison. The index is scaled to the plan’s original 1,000 lives, but by year 3 it represents 880 survivors. The index sets the floating leg at 880 × $10,000 = $8,800,000. The plan receives $8,800,000 − $8,650,663 = $149,337 net and still pays $8,950,000 to members. That leaves $8,800,663 of outflow, $150,000 more than with matched indemnity because of 15 missing survivor-equivalents at $10,000 each.
The index could also outlive the plan and over-offset its costs. Age, occupation and other differences can make a broad index a poor match. An indemnity contract avoids that particular index mismatch for the specified benefits. It can still leave uncovered payments, such as pensions for people outside the deal or payments after expiry. [1] [2]
Counterparty Risk: A Payment Can Fail Even if the Hedge Matches
Return to the year-3 indemnity hedge. Suppose the counterparty misses the $299,337 net payment, the plan can immediately apply $100,000 of pledged collateral, and there is no other recovery. The plan still disburses $8,950,000 to retirees. Its outflow becomes $8,950,000 − $100,000 = $8,850,000, or $199,337 more than if the hedge had performed. The example measures a missed settlement only, not the cost to replace the contract. [2]
Netting reduces the amount exchanged and enforceable collateral can reduce credit losses. Collateral can also tie up cash or liquid securities. A plan should understand when it or the counterparty must post collateral and what is recoverable if the contract ends early. A short hedge also leaves the plan exposed if renewal is unavailable or more expensive. [2] [3]
Longevity Swap vs. Buy-In vs. Buy-Out
The U.K. Pensions Regulator distinguishes these arrangements by the risks insured and who remains legally responsible to members. The terminology below describes that U.K. framework; the U.S. section explains its own legal rules. [3]
| Arrangement | What the scheme receives | Who owes members their pensions? |
|---|---|---|
| Longevity swap | Payments linked to covered longevity experience under the contract | The scheme remains responsible. |
| Buy-in | A bulk annuity held as a scheme asset. It can cover investment, inflation and longevity risks for the insured benefits. | The trustees are still responsible; insurer payments go to the scheme. |
| Full buy-out | Insurer takes on the covered obligations in exchange for a premium. | The insurer becomes directly responsible. Trustees can then wind up the scheme after addressing any residual risks. |
A full buy-in can cover all the remaining benefits before a buy-out changes the payer. In August 2025, the Rolls-Royce UK Pension Fund entered into a £4.3 billion full buy-in with Pension Insurance Corporation. On July 3, 2026, the trustee assigned individual policy rights to members to complete the buy-out. The two dates mark separate steps in one transaction history; they do not set a timeline for other schemes. [6] [7]
For a narrower transfer, Bell Canada and Sun Life announced a longevity insurance agreement in March 2015 covering C$5 billion of pension liabilities. The plan paid monthly premiums and received monthly payments linked to existing retirees’ lifetimes. BCE retained responsibility for paying the pensions. The C$5 billion described the liabilities covered, not the premium. [8]
U.S. Annuity Transfers: ERISA and PBGC Protection
For a U.S. defined benefit plan subject to the fiduciary rules of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), choosing an insurer to take over benefit payments through an annuity is a fiduciary decision. ERISA requires loyalty and prudence. The Department of Labor’s Interpretive Bulletin 95-1 calls for an objective, thorough search aimed at the safest available annuity, unless participants’ and beneficiaries’ interests justify a different choice. More than one provider can qualify. Credit ratings alone do not suffice, and cost cannot justify an unsafe annuity. [9] [10]
The evaluation considers the insurer’s investment portfolio, size relative to the contract, capital and surplus, other business exposures, contract guarantees and the extent of state guaranty association protection. A fiduciary without the necessary expertise needs qualified independent advice. [10]
For a single-employer plan covered by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) that ends in a standard termination, PBGC says its guarantee ends for a participant’s benefit when the plan buys that participant’s annuity. A buyout can also transfer one group’s benefits while the rest of the plan continues. PBGC’s June 2026 opinion letter illustrates why PBGC does not back an insurer for benefits actually transferred away from the plan. The letter answers a reporting question on a specific transaction; it does not define the result for every deal. [11] [12]
The insurer owes the transferred annuity under its contract. If the insurer cannot pay, state guaranty association coverage may apply to all, part or none of it, depending on applicable law. A plan-level swap, where benefit obligations stay with the plan, does not by itself end PBGC protection for an otherwise covered benefit. If you receive a transfer notice, check who will owe the benefit, which options the contract preserves and which protections apply. [11] [12] [13]
Common Mistakes When Comparing Longevity Hedges
- Confusing a fixed schedule with a fixed dollar amount. The schedule can fall as the covered group ages; the amounts were still set in advance.
- Using plan survival to calculate an index payment. Check which group sets the floating amount and how head counts translate to dollars.
- Counting a hedge receipt as a reduction in what members are owed. First calculate member payments, then net the hedge separately.
- Assuming a hedge covers every benefit or ensures collection. Check which people, payments and dates qualify, and what happens after expiry or default.
What to Check Before Comparing Contract Costs
Compare the same benefits over the same dates. For example, a quote on retirees’ own pensions is not comparable to one that also insures eligible spouse benefits. Look at which mortality assumptions and payment rules drive the quote, whether the agreement nets and when collateral can be used. A longevity swap leaves the plan with the assets that must fund the remaining cash needs. A bulk annuity buy-in uses plan assets to buy a contract; consider how much liquidity remains for other obligations. [2] [3]
The example models three years of cash. It does not establish an accounting settlement, a change in required contributions or an actual swap price. Those questions require the transaction terms and the applicable measurement or reporting rules.
Frequently Asked Questions
Sources and Rule Dates
- OECD, Mortality Assumptions and Longevity Risk, December 2014, chapter 6: pooling, longevity transfer and index mismatch.
- Canada’s Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, Longevity Insurance and Longevity Swaps, June 2014: cash flows, coverage and risks in ongoing federally regulated defined benefit plans.
- The Pensions Regulator, New Models and Options in Defined Benefit Pensions Schemes, June 3, 2025, “Insurance solutions”: U.K. longevity insurance, buy-ins and buy-outs.
- Actuarial Standards Board, ASOP No. 27, effective for reports and measurements dated January 1, 2025 or later, sections 3.12–3.13: selecting mortality and improvement assumptions.
- IRS Notice 2025-40, July 28, 2025: specific funding and minimum present value mortality tables for 2026.
- Pension Insurance Corporation, Rolls-Royce Full Buy-In Announcement, August 11, 2025.
- Rolls-Royce Holdings, 2026 Half Year Results, July 30, 2026, “Post balance sheet events” and note 19: assignment of policy rights and buy-out completion.
- Sun Life and BCE, Bell Canada Longevity Insurance Announcement, March 3, 2015.
- 29 U.S.C. § 1104, ERISA fiduciary duties, read November 18, 2026.
- U.S. Department of Labor, Interpretive Bulletin 95-1, 29 CFR § 2509.95-1, read November 18, 2026: insurer selection when transferring liability through a defined benefit distribution.
- PBGC, How Pension Plans End, standard termination and effect of annuity purchase, read November 18, 2026.
- PBGC Opinion Letter 26-001, June 15, 2026, page 2 and note 1: specified benefits transferred from an ongoing plan.
- PBGC, State Life and Health Insurance Guaranty Association Offices, coverage may vary, read November 18, 2026.
This article is educational and does not provide actuarial, investment, accounting or legal advice. The swap amounts are hypothetical. Plan rules, policy terms and applicable law determine actual benefits and protections.
