Discount for Lack of Marketability
Table of Contents
A private company’s business can be valuable while one shareholder’s stake is difficult to sell. The discount for lack of marketability, or DLOM, addresses that difference: what is an ownership interest worth when its owner cannot readily turn it into cash on the terms assumed in a marketable-value benchmark?
The hard part is choosing and supporting the adjustment. A minority interest, a controlling interest, and a transfer-restricted share have different characteristics. This guide separates those questions, examines restricted-stock studies, pre-IPO studies and option-based models, and works through an explicitly hypothetical valuation. The discussion uses a U.S. educational context; an actual appraisal must follow its own purpose, valuation date and governing rules.
What Are Closely Held Shares?
Closely held shares belong to a company with relatively few owners and limited trading in its stock. A family manufacturing business and an investor-backed startup can both fit that description, despite having very different risks and shareholder rights. The absence of an active quotation makes evidence about the particular interest especially important.[1]
An investor buys a particular package of cash-flow, voting and transfer rights. A DLOM measures a marketability adjustment relative to a suitable starting value; it does not replace the valuation of the underlying business.
For example, owning 10% of a company’s common shares does not necessarily entitle the investor to sell 10% of its assets, demand a distribution or force an acquisition. Nor does a recent preferred-share financing automatically establish the price of ordinary common shares. Read the charter and shareholder agreements before comparing prices. Revenue Ruling 59-60 specifically identifies voting, dividend and liquidation rights as relevant to closely held stock valuation.[1]
The VC term sheet guide explains many of these provisions. Here, the task is to understand how the resulting claim’s ability to reach an exit affects its value. The broader financing and exit setting is covered in entrepreneurial finance.
DLOM vs. Lack of Control
Control concerns what the owner can cause the company to do. Marketability concerns the owner’s ability to sell the interest. A public-company investor can hold a small, noncontrolling position that is readily tradable. A person controlling a private company can direct many decisions yet still need time and expense to find a buyer.
| Characteristic | Question to investigate | Possible valuation implication |
|---|---|---|
| Operating business | What cash flows, assets and risks support the business? | Establish the underlying value before interest-specific adjustments. |
| Control rights | Can this block direct distributions, management or a sale? | A supported control or lack-of-control adjustment may be relevant to the starting basis. |
| Marketability | Can the owner find a buyer and complete a permitted sale? | A supported DLOM may bridge marketable and nonmarketable values of the interest. |
These characteristics can interact. An owner able to initiate a sale of the company has a different exit position from an owner who must wait for someone else’s decision. Distinguishing control and marketability does not mean they are economically independent or that every valuation requires two separate discounts.[2]
Identify the starting level of value
A useful working distinction is among a controlling-level benchmark, a marketable minority-interest value and a nonmarketable minority-interest value. These labels describe the assumed rights and sale conditions. They are not interchangeable dollar amounts.
Comparable companies analysis commonly draws on prices for tradable, noncontrolling shares. Applying a further lack-of-control discount to a value already reflecting the subject’s minority rights would need a distinct justification. A DCF’s level of value depends on its cash flows and assumptions; the letters “DCF” do not establish control or marketability treatment. See DCF valuation and market multiples for the underlying methods.
Finish the appropriate enterprise-to-equity and security-allocation work before adjusting a common-share interest. A shareholder-level DLOM should not automatically reduce every creditor’s claim. The enterprise value and equity value distinction helps keep those scopes consistent.
The Discount for Lack of Marketability Formula
Once a suitable marketable value and a supported discount have been established, the arithmetic is straightforward:
For a matched pair of values, DLOM = 1 − Vnonmarketable / Vmarketable. The denominator matters: the discount is measured against the marketable value. The formula does not tell you whether 10%, 20% or another adjustment is justified.
A private-share transaction price, an interest-specific cash-flow model or a required return may already reflect limited marketability. Adding a full separate DLOM can count the same constraint twice. Identify what the starting analysis includes before changing it.[2][9]
Worked Example: A $2 Million Minority Interest
Suppose an investor owns 10,000 ordinary common shares in a hypothetical closely held company. Assume a separate analysis has established $200 per share on a marketable minority basis, giving the block a $2,000,000 benchmark. That analysis already reflects the block’s noncontrolling rights and the applicable common-share economics.
For this example, assume the shareholder agreement requires board consent and gives existing owners a right of first refusal. There is no assured redemption, cash distributions are not promised and the timing of a company sale is uncertain. These are hypothetical facts to investigate, rather than legal conclusions about any real agreement. Now assume a 20% DLOM solely to demonstrate the calculation; those facts alone do not establish that percentage.
Marketable block value: 10,000 × $200 = $2,000,000.
Assumed marketability reduction: $2,000,000 × 20% = $400,000.
Nonmarketable indication: $2,000,000 × 80% = $1,600,000.
Indicated value per share: $1,600,000 / 10,000 = $160.
No additional lack-of-control discount belongs in this calculation merely because the owner holds a minority stake: the $200 benchmark was expressly a minority-interest value. Holding that $2 million base fixed, assumed DLOMs of 10% and 30% would instead produce $1.8 million and $1.4 million. That range illustrates sensitivity, not an evidence-based appraisal range.
A separate example that starts from control value
Reset the starting assumption. In this different hypothetical, suppose $2 million is the relevant block’s pro-rata controlling-level benchmark, and the goal is to value a noncontrolling, nonmarketable interest. Assume a justified 10% lack-of-control discount and then a 20% DLOM. Apply the second factor to the value remaining after the first adjustment.
| Value basis | Interest value (USD millions) |
|---|---|
| Control benchmark | 2.00 |
| Marketable minority | 1.80 |
| Nonmarketable minority | 1.44 |
Hypothetical reset: $2 million control benchmark, 10% lack-of-control discount, then 20% DLOM. Distinct from the first example’s minority base.
The calculation is $2,000,000 × 0.90 × 0.80 = $1,440,000. The combined reduction is 1 − 0.90 × 0.80 = 28%. Adding 10% and 20% would incorrectly imply a 30% reduction, or $1.4 million. The correct second reduction is 20% of $1.8 million, or $360,000.
The chart shows changes in the assumed value basis, rather than a timeline of investment losses. It also does not establish that a particular controlling shareholder should receive a minority discount. The rights of the interest being valued determine which steps, if any, belong in the analysis.
A control premium is not the same percentage as a minority discount
Suppose matched marketable values are $100 for a noncontrolling interest and $125 at the controlling level. The control premium is ($125 − $100) / $100 = 25%. Returning from $125 to $100 requires a ($125 − $100) / $125 = 20% discount.
A strategic buyer’s announced acquisition premium may also reflect buyer-specific synergies, competition and other deal terms. It cannot automatically be converted into a pure lack-of-control discount for a different company. Likewise, the consolidated financial statements example explains why a parent’s controlling-block price need not establish the outside shareholders’ per-share fair value.
How Analysts Estimate DLOM
Three common approaches offer different kinds of evidence. Their usefulness depends on whether their subjects, rights, dates and assumptions resemble the interest being valued.
| Approach | Core comparison | Main analytical challenge |
|---|---|---|
| Restricted stock | Restricted transaction price versus a contemporaneous public price for the same issuer. | Separate resale constraints from block size, rights, issuer condition and financing terms. |
| Pre-IPO | A private transaction price versus the company’s later IPO price. | Separate market access from changed prospects, transaction types and successful-IPO selection. |
| Option model | A modeled value of protection or foregone selling flexibility. | Defend the horizon, volatility and economic meaning of the modeled right. |
Restricted-stock studies
The attraction of restricted-stock evidence is the same-issuer comparison. A contemporaneous public quotation controls for more business-specific differences than a comparison between unrelated private and public companies. Silber’s 1991 research, for example, compared restricted and public securities and related the discount to relative block size and issuer creditworthiness.[4]
Nevertheless, an observed placement discount need not measure marketability alone. Registration rights, warrants or other bundled terms can change what the buyer receives. The issuer may be raising capital under pressure; the block may have monitoring benefits; and the public price may have its own trading limitations. Check transaction-level comparability rather than copying a published average.[6]
Historical resale rules also matter. The two-year period described in Silber’s public abstract belongs to that study’s setting. Under current Rule 144, the general minimum is six months for qualifying reporting-issuer restricted securities and one year for other issuers; affiliate status and other conditions affect the available safe harbor. Rule 144 is not the only resale route, and passing a minimum holding period does not create a buyer or eliminate contractual restrictions.[3]
Pre-IPO studies
A pre-IPO study compares prices before and at an initial public offering. Emory’s authors describe an adjusted 1980–2000 study using a qualifying transaction within five months before the IPO, selecting the farthest qualifying transaction in that window. Its 543 observations include both sale and option transactions.[5]
This design changes both market access and the observation date. A company’s business prospects and market conditions can change between the private transaction and offering. A sample defined by completed IPOs also leaves out businesses that never reach that exit. Those differences prevent treating the entire price gap as an isolated marketability effect.[6]
Inspect the underlying transaction type too. Emory’s own adjustment notes identify grants to officers or employees and changes between preferred-share and option classifications. Such observations should not all be described as arm’s-length purchases of identical common shares. A nearby date alone does not make two prices comparable.[5]
Option-Based Marketability Models
An option model puts structure around a question that historical averages cannot answer directly: how might the economic cost change with the duration of the restriction and uncertainty in the share’s value? The model still needs a defensible interpretation.
Protective-put proxy versus a perfect-timing bound
The Chaffe-style approach uses a European put as a proxy. A put struck at today’s marketable value provides protection against a lower value at expiration. The first-party discussion from Chaffe’s firm also identifies an important limitation: that fixed-strike structure does not capture the ability to realize an intermediate gain during the holding period.[8]
Longstaff’s original 1995 paper asks a different question. It gives a hypothetical investor perfect timing: without the restriction, that investor could sell at the maximum price reached during the interval. The resulting lookback construction supplies an upper bound under its framework, rather than the discount an ordinary investor necessarily experiences.[7]
A downside-insurance value, a perfect-timing bound and the ability to sell at the then-prevailing price are different economic objects. A put can have substantial value even on a fully liquid stock. Calling its cost a DLOM proxy does not prove that it measures only illiquidity.[9]
Hypothetical holding-period and volatility sensitivity
For a separate mathematical illustration, consider an at-the-money European put: its strike equals the share’s starting marketable value. Assume no dividends, a zero risk-free interest rate, constant volatility and a known restriction horizon, within the standard frictionless, lognormal option-pricing framework. The zero rate is a deliberate simplification, not a statement about current interest rates. This illustration does not estimate the earlier example’s 20% DLOM.
Under those assumptions, put cost divided by the starting share value simplifies to the expression below. Here, σ is annualized volatility of logarithmic share returns, T is the horizon in years, and N is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Volatility is not beta: this calculation uses total share-price uncertainty.
Keep those assumptions fixed and vary only the horizon and assumed annual volatility. The following chart’s three series use 20%, 40% and 60% volatility. Its values are calculated option-cost percentages, not transaction observations or recommended marketability discounts.
| Horizon (years) | 20% volatility | 40% volatility | 60% volatility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| 0.5 | 5.64 | 11.25 | 16.80 |
| 1 | 7.97 | 15.85 | 23.58 |
| 2 | 11.25 | 22.27 | 32.86 |
| 3 | 13.75 | 27.10 | 39.67 |
Hypothetical European-put calculations: strike equals starting value, zero interest, no dividends and constant volatility; zero horizon is a limit.
At 40% volatility, the one-year result is 2N(0.40 × √1 / 2) − 1 = 2N(0.20) − 1 = 15.85%, rounded. Extending that assumed horizon to three years increases the proxy to 27.10%. Higher volatility also increases the protection cost at a given horizon.
The pattern explains why the inputs need evidence. A private company’s lack of daily quotes does not mean its economic volatility is zero. Public-peer volatility may help, but leverage, business mix and the rights of the subject security affect comparability. An expected exit date is also not a guarantee; a single fixed horizon may hide the possibility of a delayed sale.
The apparent precision belongs to the assumed mathematical model. Actual analysis needs appropriate interest and distribution assumptions, a defensible horizon and an explanation of why the modeled payoff helps assess the subject interest. An option proxy is neither automatically the final appraisal discount nor a universal minimum or maximum for every setting.
How to Evaluate a Closely Held Interest
- Define the assignment. Record the valuation date, purpose, governing standard, security class and exact block. A proposed purchase price and a statutory appraisal may answer different questions.
- Read the rights. Identify consent requirements, rights of first refusal, eligible buyers, co-sale rights, redemption terms and information access. Distinguish an enforceable right from management’s expectation.
- Map realistic liquidity paths. Consider a permitted secondary sale, company redemption, acquisition or IPO. Record timing, conditions, financing ability and what happens if the expected exit fails.
- Audit the starting value. Identify its enterprise/equity scope, security allocation, control assumptions and existing marketability treatment. Avoid an adjustment merely because the company is privately owned.
- Select comparable evidence and test assumptions. Explain why particular transactions or a model fit the interest. Show sensitivities to material assumptions and reconcile differences among approaches.
- Document the conclusion. Explain the selected adjustment, the evidence it relies on, the resulting value basis and the uncertainty that remains.
Consider how the rights work together. A redemption provision can offer an exit, but its timing, price formula, funding and enforceability matter. A right of first refusal gives someone a chance to match a qualifying offer; it does not guarantee that an outside offer will arrive. Cash distributions can reduce reliance on a future sale, while uncertain distributions leave more value dependent on that exit. These are questions for the particular interest, rather than a scoring system that mechanically produces a discount.
For investors considering private-company deals, the private equity and venture capital guide supplies the broader fund and investment context. The interest-level analysis still needs the actual company’s documents and evidence.
Common Mistakes When Applying DLOM
- Choosing a customary private-company percentage. Ownership structure alone does not support a specific discount. Connect the conclusion to the subject rights, exit evidence and valuation date.
- Discounting the wrong value base. State whether the starting amount represents enterprise value, equity, a controlling-level benchmark or the relevant minority security.
- Adding overlapping adjustments. Examine illiquidity already reflected in transaction prices, cash flows or required returns before layering on another reduction.
- Adding percentage discounts arithmetically. Sequential 10% and 20% reductions retain 0.90 × 0.80 = 72% of the original benchmark.
- Treating preferred and common prices as identical. Dividend, liquidation and other rights can make a financing-round price a poor direct benchmark for another class.
- Equating resale eligibility with practical liquidity. A legal route to transfer shares does not establish a ready buyer, a price or an immediate closing.
- Treating model output as observed market evidence. A 15.85% hypothetical put cost does not prove that an actual restricted interest trades at that discount.
Limitations and Valuation Standards
Fair market value, financial-reporting fair value and a particular buyer’s negotiated investment value are not automatically the same measure. The applicable rules determine which characteristics and assumptions belong in the valuation.
For federal estate-tax purposes, Treasury’s fair-market-value definition uses a hypothetical willing buyer and seller, reasonable knowledge and absence of compulsion; it excludes a forced-sale-price basis.[10] A seller’s urgent cash need therefore does not, by itself, establish the appropriate federal FMV discount. Other purposes require their own legal and factual analysis.
Accounting provides a concrete boundary. FASB’s ASU 2022-03 communicates ASC 820 amendments under which a holder’s contractual sale restriction is not included in measuring the equity security’s fair value. The update includes transition provisions for some investment-company holdings.[11] An economically relevant negotiation constraint is therefore not automatically an allowable accounting discount; consult the current Codification and the facts before reaching a reporting conclusion.
Historical evidence has limits as well. Silber’s public publisher abstract was available for this article, but its full underlying study was not independently replicated. Emory’s published design and adjustment notes were reviewed, rather than every original prospectus or its entire spreadsheet. The original 1993 Chaffe paper was not available in full; the discussion uses the firm’s later first-party explanation. The examples supply transparent arithmetic, not an appraisal opinion.
There is no universal IRS-approved DLOM percentage in the material cited here. Revenue Ruling 59-60 rejects a generally applicable valuation formula. The IRS’s currently linked 2009 DLOM job aid is expressly a historical reference document, not an official IRS position or legal authority.[1][2]
Frequently Asked Questions
There is no single reasonable percentage for all closely held shares. The conclusion depends on the specific interest, governing valuation standard, transfer rights, expected exit, distributions and supporting evidence. The 20% figure in this article is an assumption used to explain arithmetic, not a recommended or IRS-approved discount.
A separate DLOM is not automatic. First determine the applicable valuation standard and whether the starting value already reflects the interest’s marketability. Exit rights and the available buyer market can also differ substantially among private-company securities. A separate reduction without that analysis can double count an existing adjustment.
No. A lack-of-control discount concerns the rights associated with a noncontrolling interest relative to an appropriate controlling-level benchmark. DLOM concerns marketability relative to the matching marketable value. Control can affect exit opportunities, so the two questions interact, but they should not be treated as interchangeable labels.
If both adjustments are justified and the starting basis requires both, multiply the retained-value factors: 0.90 × 0.80 = 0.72. The combined discount is 28%. A $2 million controlling-level benchmark therefore becomes $1.44 million in that hypothetical. A $2 million base already stated as marketable minority value would require a different analysis.
It can calculate a conditional protection-cost proxy under specified assumptions. That does not make the output the exact discount for a private share. The analyst must justify the horizon, volatility, distributions and model interpretation. Fixed-strike protection, perfect market timing and ordinary ability to sell at a prevailing price represent different rights.
A credible exit path can change the analysis, but its conditions still matter. An IPO can be delayed or abandoned; a redemption depends on its contractual terms and the company’s ability to pay. Identify when cash can actually reach the shareholder and what happens if the planned exit does not occur.
Sources and Further Reading
Sources opened November 11–12, 2026. Historical studies are identified by their original periods and publication dates. Current eCFR pages displayed text through November 9, 2026. Staff aids and research models are used for the stated educational purposes, not as substitutes for governing law or current accounting standards.
- IRS, Revenue Ruling 59-60, reproduced in Appendix A of the 2014 S Corporation Valuation Job Aid, printed pp.22–26, sections 1–4. The surrounding staff aid is not an official IRS position.
- IRS, Valuation of Assets reference listing and Discount for Lack of Marketability: Job Aid for IRS Valuation Professionals, September 25, 2009; disclaimer and printed pp.4–6. Historical, nonauthoritative methodological context.
- SEC, 17 CFR 230.144, preliminary note and paragraphs (a)–(d); and Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Control Securities, investor explanation, January 2013.
- William L. Silber, Discounts on Restricted Stock: The Impact of Illiquidity on Stock Prices, Financial Analysts Journal 47(4), July 1991, pp.60–64. Public publisher abstract reviewed; full study not independently replicated.
- John D. Emory Sr., F.R. Dengel III and John D. Emory Jr., Emory Pre-IPO Discount Studies 1980–2000, as adjusted October 10, 2002, both pages; and authors’ transaction adjustment explanations, introductory and initial transaction notes.
- Espen Robak and Lance S. Hall, Bringing Sanity to Marketability Discounts: A New Data Source, first four PDF pages. FMV study authors’ discussion, hosted by NYU; no reliable publication date printed in the reviewed opening pages.
- Francis A. Longstaff, How Much Can Marketability Affect Security Values?, Journal of Finance 50(5), December 1995, pp.1767–1774; original pp.1767–1768 inspected for the perfect-timing upper-bound framework.
- Marc Steven Katsanis, Chaffe & Associates, Stand Up and Shout—It Is Another DLOM Put Model!, March 1, 2012; first-party discussion of the fixed-strike put approach and its limitations.
- Aswath Damodaran, Marketability and Value: Measuring the Illiquidity Discount, July 2005; put-cost critique, pp.41–42, and double-counting discussion, pp.47–48.
- Treasury, 26 CFR 20.2031-1(b), federal estate-tax valuation of property and fair-market-value definition.
- FASB, ASU 2022-03: Fair Value Measurement of Equity Securities Subject to Contractual Sale Restrictions, June 2022; summary and amendments to ASC 820-10-35-6B and 35-36B. The current Codification governs actual U.S. GAAP application.
Disclaimer
This article is for educational and informational purposes only and does not constitute investment, valuation, accounting, legal or tax advice. All worked valuations, discount assumptions and option-cost figures are hypothetical. Actual conclusions depend on the interest’s rights, reliable evidence, valuation purpose, date and governing standards. Consult qualified valuation, legal and tax professionals for a specific transaction or filing.
Keep reading
More in Corporate Finance
-
What is Corporate Finance? Types of Firms & the Financial Manager
Corporate finance is the study of how firms make three core financial decisions — capital budgeting, capital structure, and working capital management…
-
Time Value of Money: Present Value and Future Value Explained
The time value of money is the foundational principle that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future.
-
Net Present Value & IRR: Formulas, Examples, and When They Disagree
Net present value (NPV) and internal rate of return (IRR) are the two most widely used capital budgeting tools.
