Credit Suisse Collapse: Funding, Confidence, Losses, and the UBS Rescue
Table of Contents
Credit Suisse’s collapse in March 2023 was a funding crisis years in the making. Losses and failures in risk management weakened confidence, and clients pulled money from the bank. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) lent Credit Suisse 168 billion Swiss francs (CHF) as UBS agreed to take it over. Separately, the Swiss regulator FINMA ordered about CHF 16 billion of capital notes written down to zero. The loans supplied cash; the write-down removed claims on the bank. [1] [6] [8]
Credit Suisse common shareholders received UBS shares under the merger, while holders of the written-down notes received no shares through the write-down. That result raised two different questions: what the notes’ terms allowed and what Swiss law empowered FINMA to do. A Swiss court later annulled FINMA’s order in a partial ruling. That ruling was appealed and did not decide what noteholders should recover. [9] [13] [15]
Why confidence in Credit Suisse broke down
FINMA’s findings point to problems that preceded the run. Credit Suisse failed to identify, limit and monitor its exposure to Archegos, a client whose failure caused losses for the bank. FINMA also found serious supervisory breaches in the bank’s relationship with Greensill and its oversight of supply chain finance funds. Its postmortem described repeated strategy changes, losses and damage to the bank’s reputation. That history helps explain why clients had reason to reassess the bank. Like other financial crises, the run followed a buildup of problems that cannot be reduced to one event. [1]
Three disclosures show different parts of the strain. Credit Suisse reported a CHF 7.293 billion net loss attributable to shareholders for 2022. It reported CHF 110.5 billion of net asset outflows in the fourth quarter of 2022 and CHF 61.2 billion in the first quarter of 2023. UBS’s merger filing separately reported that Credit Suisse customer deposits fell by CHF 138 billion in the fourth quarter of 2022. The loss measures earnings, net asset outflows measure net client flows in the group’s assets under management, and the deposit decline measures a change in a source of bank funding. The last two measures can overlap and cannot be added to calculate how much cash the bank needed. [2] [3] [4]
On March 15, 2023, FINMA and the SNB said Credit Suisse met regulatory capital and liquidity requirements. That was a point-in-time assessment. As withdrawals continued, the bank needed cash it could access quickly. Regulatory capital is a measure of the resources available to absorb losses; funding liquidity is the ability to make payments as they come due. A deposit withdrawal uses cash and reduces the bank’s deposit liabilities. By itself it need not generate a loss, though a bank that has to sell assets in a hurry can take losses. See the bank balance sheet guide for a worked example of each effect. [1] [5]
What the Swiss National Bank lent
The SNB began advancing funds on March 16. On March 19, Swiss authorities announced the supported takeover after considering alternatives that included temporary public ownership and restructuring. FINMA said the bank risked running out of cash even if it remained solvent. Separately, the SNB announced two new funding ceilings: up to CHF 100 billion of additional emergency liquidity assistance for Credit Suisse and UBS combined, and up to CHF 100 billion under a federally guaranteed facility for Credit Suisse. [6] [7] [8]
| Facility | March 16 | March 17 | March 20 | Total advanced |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Collateralized emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) | 38 | 0 | 0 | 38 |
| Liquidity-shortage financing facility (LSFF) | 10 | 0 | 0 | 10 |
| Additional emergency liquidity assistance (ELA+) | 0 | 20 | 30 | 50 |
| Public liquidity backstop (PLB) | 0 | 0 | 70 | 70 |
| Total | 48 | 20 | 100 | 168 |
To reconcile the total, add the five advances: 38 + 10 + 20 + 30 + 70 = CHF 168 billion. ELA+ carried preferential creditor status in bankruptcy. The PLB also carried preferential creditor status, plus a federal guarantee against default on the covered loans. Credit Suisse drew CHF 50 billion under ELA+ and CHF 70 billion under the PLB; the two CHF 100 billion ceilings described borrowing capacity. The CHF 168 billion figure measures central bank lending, not government spending or losses. [6] [7]
Credit Suisse repaid the PLB loans by the end of May 2023 and the ELA+ loans by August 10. The PLB agreement ended on August 11, along with a separate federal guarantee that would have covered up to CHF 9 billion in eligible losses on specified assets after UBS took the first CHF 5 billion in losses. UBS terminated that asset guarantee without any payout. Repayments reduced the ordinary ELA balance in the first quarter of 2024. The remaining balance was repaid in the second quarter. [10] [11]
What Credit Suisse shareholders received
UBS announced an all-share purchase valued at CHF 3 billion on March 19, 2023, or CHF 0.76 per Credit Suisse share at the announcement. The exchange ratio was one UBS share for every 22.48 Credit Suisse shares. For example, a holding of 2,248 Credit Suisse common shares ÷ 22.48 = 100 UBS shares. That calculation gives the number of shares, whose market value can change. The acquisition closed on June 12, 2023. [9]
Why Credit Suisse’s AT1 notes were written down
Additional Tier 1 (AT1) instruments can count toward a bank’s regulatory capital because they can absorb losses under specified conditions. Depending on the terms, they may be written down or converted into equity. On March 19, FINMA ordered the full write-down of about CHF 16 billion in nominal Credit Suisse AT1 principal, and Credit Suisse confirmed execution on March 20. Removing those claims increased core capital without bringing cash into the bank or exchanging the notes for shares. [8] [12] [13]
What one contract required
The Swiss Federal Administrative Court reproduced the terms of Credit Suisse’s USD 4.500% perpetual contingent write-down notes, Regulation S issue USH3698DDD33. Section 7(a) gave the notes a mechanical trigger tied to the Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio. That threshold was not breached. The same section defined a separate Viability Event. Both routes applied only if ordinary measures to improve the issuer’s capital adequacy were inadequate or infeasible. [12] [13]
- Write-down or conversion route. The regulator had to notify Credit Suisse Group of its determination that writing down these notes and writing down or converting other eligible capital instruments were essential to prevent insolvency, bankruptcy, failure to pay a material portion of its debts when due, or an end to business operations.
- Public support route. Credit Suisse Group had to receive an irrevocable commitment of extraordinary public support that improved or would imminently improve its capital adequacy. The regulator also had to determine that without the support, the issuer would have experienced at least one of those same outcomes. [13]
What FINMA decided and what the courts have ruled
FINMA said the federally guaranteed liquidity support constituted a Viability Event. It also invoked Article 5a of Switzerland’s emergency ordinance, which addressed FINMA’s power to order a write-down. Those are separate grounds to examine: whether the contract’s conditions were met and whether the authority had power to order the action. [12]
In its October 1, 2025 partial ruling in B-2334/2023, the Federal Administrative Court found neither viability provision satisfied. It distinguished liquidity assistance from support that improved Credit Suisse’s capital adequacy and pointed out that the separate asset-loss guarantee benefited UBS. It also concluded that FINMA lacked sufficient legal authority for the order. The court annulled the order without deciding whether to reverse the write-down or grant other relief. On October 22 it suspended its other pending cases on the write-down. [13] [14]
FINMA and UBS appealed on November 13, 2025, in cases 2C_661/2025 and 2C_662/2025. On December 8, the appeals were given suspensive effect, putting the annulment on hold while the appeals proceed. A published March 5, 2026 Federal Supreme Court decision records those steps and dismisses a separate appeal over access to case documents as inadmissible. As of a November 18, 2026 check of the public record, no published ruling on the merits of the lead appeals or order granting recovery was identified. [15]
The Swiss deal compared with EU resolution
The Swiss deal combined a merger, in which common shareholders received UBS stock, with a regulatory order to write down AT1 notes. The two outcomes were not distributions from a single pool of liquidation proceeds. On March 20, the EU’s banking and resolution authorities said common equity absorbs losses before AT1 in the EU resolution framework. That statement explains why the Swiss outcome stood out; it does not decide what Swiss law, U.S. law or a particular note contract requires. [8] [9] [16]
Credit Suisse in March 2023
EU resolution framework
- The EU authorities described loss allocation in resolution.
- Common equity takes losses first.
- Once common equity is used up, AT1 takes losses next. [16]
How to analyze a bank under funding pressure
When analyzing a bank or one of its securities, check three things:
- How quickly can funding leave? Compare the trend in deposits with the cash and readily usable collateral available at the same legal entity. A quarterly capital ratio does not measure how fast those balances can change.
- What can trigger a loss on this instrument? Identify the issuer, jurisdiction, contractual ranking and any capital ratio or discretionary viability triggers. Check whether the notes convert or are written down. An AT1 note’s treatment cannot be inferred from the label on a U.S. bank’s preferred stock.
- Which process governs recovery? Separate a supported merger’s terms from the priority rules in a formal resolution or liquidation. A credit model can compare loss scenarios; estimating a distressed debt recovery also requires knowing the specific claim and process.
Common mistakes
- Treating a reported loss as a withdrawal. Earnings, net flows in assets under management and deposit changes measure different things.
- Treating every rescue figure as cash paid by the government. Distinguish loans drawn, facility ceilings, guarantees, share consideration and nominal principal written down.
- Reading the October 2025 ruling as a payout. The ruling was partial and appealed. [13] [15]
Limits of the Credit Suisse comparison
The reported quarterly flows show the scale of pressure, but do not reconstruct the bank’s cash position by day. The case records also cannot establish what creditors would have received under a different rescue or what an individual holder might recover. Use the actual security terms and the applicable legal process when comparing the case with another bank. [3] [13] [15]
Frequently asked questions
Sources
- FINMA’s Credit Suisse postmortem (December 19, 2023) and enforcement findings on Archegos (July 24, 2023) and Greensill (February 28, 2023).
- Credit Suisse Group 2022 Form 20-F, filed March 14, 2023; net loss attributable to shareholders.
- Credit Suisse Group first-quarter 2023 results, April 24, 2023; p. 32, net new assets and outflows.
- UBS merger prospectus, June 9, 2023; Background of the Merger.
- FINMA and SNB joint statement, March 15, 2023.
- SNB 2023 Annual Report, Chronicle of monetary events, p. 226; Accountability report, chapters 2.6 and 6.1.
- SNB announcement on liquidity assistance and the UBS takeover, March 19, 2023.
- FINMA announcement approving the takeover, March 19, 2023; Swiss parliamentary inquiry summary, December 17, 2024, pp. 20–23.
- UBS’s merger announcement, March 19, 2023, and closing announcement, June 12, 2023.
- Swiss Federal Department of Finance, takeover contracts; UBS, repayment and termination announcement, August 11, 2023.
- SNB 2024 Accountability report, p. 64, section 2.5; first- and second-quarter 2024 repayments.
- FINMA explanation of its AT1 decision and list of issues, March 23, 2023; March 19 emergency ordinance amendment, Article 5a.
- Swiss Federal Administrative Court partial decision B-2334/2023, October 1, 2025; facts B, sections 5–8 and operative order. English press release, October 14, 2025.
- Swiss Federal Administrative Court notice suspending other AT1 cases, October 22, 2025.
- Swiss Federal Supreme Court judgment 2C_565/2025, March 5, 2026; facts D and operative order. See also the court’s public decisions database and UBS’s October 28, 2026 earnings-call transcript, p. 14, for the company’s update.
- ECB Banking Supervision, Single Resolution Board and European Banking Authority joint statement, March 20, 2023.
Disclaimer
This article is for educational purposes and does not provide investment, legal or tax advice. The case describes Swiss actions and specific note terms. Legal proceedings and available remedies may change.
